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I. Introduction
In this contribution, brief attention will be given to the recent UN Convention on In-
dependent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit (Convention),' which was adopted
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by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11, 1995. In 1988,2 the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a UN organization
specializing in codifying and unifying international trade law, began preparing for the Con-
vention. Once the preparatory work for the Convention was concluded in 1995, the draft
convention was presented to the General Assembly States have been given a two year
period to sign the Convention. Thereafter, they should accede to it. As of the date of
writing, Belarus and the United States of America have signed the Convention and Ecuador,
El Salvador, Kuwait, Panama, and Tunisia have ratified it.4 In accordance with Article 28,
the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration
of one year from the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification. Because Tunisia, the
fifth state, deposited its ratification on December 8, 1998, the Convention will thus enter
into force on January 1, 2000.
The aim of this article is to determine whether other countries should consider acceding
to and ratifying the Convention. In addition, the possible influences of the Convention on
the practice of bank guarantees and stand-by letters of credit will be discussed.
II. Bank Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit:
Development and Sources
A. DEFINITIONS
Bank guarantees and stand-by letters of credit are fairly recent bank products. A bank
guarantee can be described as a personal security under which a bank promises payment to
a beneficiary if an account party (often the bank's client) defaults in the performance of its
obligation. Then, the bank pays if the documents presented with the demand for payment
comply with the documents that are mentioned in the text of the bank guarantee. For this
reason the bank's obligations are autonomous from the underlying agreement between the
beneficiary and the account party,5 which means that in principle the bank must pay if
proper complying documents are presented even if the beneficiary and the account party
have not stipulated that there is a default under the original agreement.
2. The first relevant UNCITRAL document was dated 21 March 1988 (A/CN.9/301). A review of the
preparatory UNCITRA.L documents can be found in UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN/.9/WG.I/WP.84 (1994).
These documents comprise the Travaux Prparatoires of the Convention, and are essential for its interpretation
and application. All these documents may also be found in the UNCITRAL Yearbooks.
Of further interest, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL has published an explanatory report on the convention,
which is an unofficial commentary and intended to be purely informative. (Eplanatory Note by the UNCITRAL
Secretariat on the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.9/431 (1996).
3. For a while, it was unclear whether the unifying text would become a model law or a convention. Except
for the contentions that a convention is capable of achieving greater unity, while a model law leaves greater
freedom and flexibility to states regarding implementation, the essential arguments on which the final choice
rested were not discussed.
4. Information obtained from the UNCITRAL-Secretariat on March 1, 1999. The status of the convention
is as follows: Belarus signed on Dec. 3, 1996; Ecuador ratified on June 18, 1997; El Salvador ratified on July
31, 1998; Kuwait ratified on Oct. 28, 1998; Panama ratified on May 21, 1998; Tunisia ratified on Dec. 8, 1998;
United States signed on Dec. 11, 1997.
5. In this regard, guarantees and stand-by letters of credit differ from "contract bonds" or "surety bonds,"
in which the security lender is only involved if the principal party defaults in the performance of an obligation.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has established rules for contract bonds in its publication ICC
Uniform Ru/esfor Contract Bonds (ICC Publ. no. 524, Paris, ICC Publishing, 1993, 20 pp.).
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Stand-by letters of credit are similar products that were developed in the United States.
The main difference between bank guarantees and letters of credit is that stand-by letters
of credit are usually drafted in the form of a letter of credit. Stand-by letters of credit are
highly similar to bank guarantees regarding their function and legal rigime although they
differ regarding their form, in that stand-by letters of credit involve documentary credits.
6
However, the most important difference between bank guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit is to be found in the fact that in the United States, unlike in other countries, stand-
by letters of credit are used much more to guarantee money obligations (as opposed to
performance obligations) incurred in transactions on the capital markets. This has caused
difficulty in international unification because liquidity of stand-by letters of credit is even
more important than under bank guarantees.
B. DEVELOPMENT
The use of bank guarantees and stand-by letters of credit has grown spectacularly since
the 1960s. As the result of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the resulting political tension
which arose between Iran and the United States, both bank guarantees and stand-by letters
of credit led to a multitude of procedures involving the key question whether payment by
a Western bank to an Iranian beneficiary (often through an Iranian bank) could be ob-
structed by petitioning judges or arbitrators for provisional and conservatory measures to
prevent payment. The grounds for the request for such measures were often the allegation
of fraud committed by the Iranian beneficiary. However, since the mid-eighties, litigation
surrounding guarantees and stand-by letters of credit has diminished and in some countries
practically dried up. This situation didn't change in relation to the Iraqi attack on Kuwait
in 1990 which did not lead to many disputes involving guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit,7 partially as the result of international sanctions against Iraq which made payments
under guarantees and stand-by letters of credit illegal. However, one cannot exclude that
in the future new diplomatic tensions or adverse economic circumstances might change the
present picture drastically.
As a result of the Iranian litigation of the 1980s, the law on guarantees and stand-by
letters of credit was strongly tested but its cornerstones remained by and large intact. Thus,
bank guarantees and stand-by letters of credit managed to survive fairly well.
C. SoURcEs
In most countries both of common and civil law origins, there are no explicit statutory
rules for guarantees and stand-by letters of credit. Disputes must, therefore, be primarily
tackled under explicit contractual provisions, unwritten rules, principles of contract and
commercial law, and case law. The most important exception to this is the United States.
In the United States, stand-by letters of credit developed for bank regulatory reasons. As a
result, disputes could be decided under Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which governs letters of credit.8 However, a number of problems regarding documentary
6. For a further discussion, see F. De Ly, Garanties en standby letters of credit, Revue de droit commercial
belge,172-174 (1986); M. Richter, Standby letter of credit, Eine systematische Darstellung unter besonderer
Berucksichtingung des US-amerikanischen Rechts, Zurich, Schulthess 338 1990.
7. For an exception, see the Italian case of Tribunale Livorno, June 4, 1996, Diritto del Commercio
Internazionale 1997, 191, case note M. Roli.
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credits are not addressed in Article 5 of the UCC, such as the requirements for temporary
and conservative measures. On crucial points regarding letters of credit, the UCC is char-
acterized by open standards, such as fraud as an exception to the bank's obligation to pay.
For these reasons, the UCC, in many respects, does not provide the United States with
greater legal certainty in comparison to other countries in which no specific regulations
exist. The absence of regulations in most countries and the number of disputes raised the
necessity of developing guidelines or rules for guarantees and stand-by letters of credit. In
general, one can distinguish between two points of view.9 On one side of the spectrum, in
certain commercial and industrial sectors (such as the construction world) it was argued
that guarantees and stand-by letters of credit were biased in favor of the beneficiary and
extended too much protection to the banks. As a result, the risks from fraud could be shifted
far too easily to the account party.'0 On the other side of the spectrum, arguments of market
economics prevailed. The bargaining positions of the parties should control, implying that
the beneficiaries dictate the terms of guarantees and stand-by letters of credit in a buyer's
market while account parties do so in a seller's market. In a buyer's market, account parties
have a choice either to take the risk and grant beneficiaries strong guarantees or not to
engage in a contract with the beneficiary.
D. SELF-REGULATION
Considering the highly international character of the market for guarantees and stand-
by letters of credit and the possibility of regulatory competition between various countries,
there have been few initiatives at the national level to design regulations. Thus, initiatives
have primarily been developed at the international level where a distinction should be made
between self-regulation and official regulation. Concerning the former, one should focus
on the work of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). As early as 1978, the ICC
published Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (UCG)." These rules were intended to
serve as a means of balancing the interests of account parties, beneficiaries, and banks, and
were only relevant for guarantees for which proof was provided of the account party's default
in the performance of his obligation. Consequently, the UCG were not appropriate for the
8. Article 5 was recently revised by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The revised Article 5 is being presented to the various state legislatures for approval and is gradually becoming
law in the various states. As far as can be speculated, the revised text of Article 5 does not affect any essential
elements regarding stand-by letters of credit.
The recent revision of the law on stand-by letters of credit in the United States, poses the question of
whether there will be an interest in ratifying the UNCITRAL Convention (which, by the way, was expressly
mentioned in the commentary on the revised Section 5-101), also because bank guarantees are used infre-
quently. At the moment, different views seem to exist as to the answers to this question (see Dolan, supra note
1, at 4) but the recent signature by the United States of the convention as well as the adoption of ISP98 (see
hereafter) to meet U.S. concerns may indicate that the U.S. is on its way to ratify the convention.
For a recognition of the convention from the bank regulatory perspective, see the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency Interpretive Ruling at 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016.
9. See also regarding this discussion with respect to the right balancing of the interests involved, G. Schrans,
Eenvormige regels voor autonome garanties, in Liber amoricum Paul De Vroede, Antwerp, Kluwer 1168-1169 and
1178-1179 (Part I) (1994) and Horn, supra note 1, at 8.
10. For an example of this argument, see Th. De Galard, Les Nouvelles Rigles Uniformes de la Chambre de
Commerce Internationale relatives aux Garanties sur Demande, 759-764 RDAI/IBLJ (1993).
11. ICC Pub. No. 325, Paris; see also Model Forms For Issuing Contract Guarantees, 16 ICC Pub. No. 406,
Paris.
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regulation of demand guarantees where a mere request for payment triggers payment. Since
at that time there was a buyers' market in relation to the oil crises and the recycling of
petrodollars from the Arab world where demand guarantees were required, the UCG were
seldom used. In response, the ICC attempted to formulate a code for demand guarantees,
which was abandoned before completion.12 As a result of the revision in 1983 of the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP),1" it was decided to specifically
include stand-by letters of credit under the scope of the UCP,14 through which the regu-
lation of stand-by letters of credit was achieved. However, the incorporation of stand-by
letters of credit into the UCP did not result in specific rules for this form of letters of credit
and thus, the application of the UCP merely implied that the UCP's general letter of credit
principles were expressly made applicable to stand-by letters of credit.
Bank guarantees were also codified. Using the model of the British Bankers Association
as a basis, negotiations began for uniform rules for demand guarantees. This led in 1992
to ICC approval and the publication of Uniform Rules on Demand Guarantees (URDG).5
The prevention of fraud is central to the URDG. The demand for payment must state the
reasons for calling on the guarantee in order to meet the URDG's clear preference for
reasoned demand guarantees. 6 The hope is that the requirement of providing reasons will
prevent fraud. Von Westphalen, correctly in my eyes, doubts the effectiveness of reasoned
demand guarantees. 7 Furthermore, in order to stop fraud it is imperative that the account
party is informed about the demand for payment. Article 17 of the URDG obliges banks
to do so but does not require"8 a bank to hold payment until the account party has been
made aware of the demand and its reasons. 19 Banks at their discretion may wait with pay-
ment or may proceed with payment as long as the account party is informed. In case of
fraud, the account party will then have the possibility of requesting provisional and/or
conservatory measures from a competent court. However, since no requirement for with-
holding payment is imposed, the fraud prevention provided in Article 17 is without much
12. See further, F. De Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, 185 Amsterdam, North Holland
(1992).
13. ICC Pub. No. 400, Paris (1983).
14. Afterwards, no changes were brought about by the approval of the last revision of the UCP in 1993 (see
Art. 1 UCP 500, 60 Paris, ICC Publishing, 1993). The use of the UCP 500 was-just as for the earlier versions
of 1962, 1974, and 1983-recommended by UNCITRAL (see UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/395 of April 29,
1994 and XXV UNCITRAL Y.B., 1994, 28).
15. ICC Pub. No. 45820, April 1992. The URDG were provided with an ICC commentary prepared by
Professor R. Goode (see Guide to the ICC Uniform Rules fr Demand Guarantees, 139, ICC Pub. No. 510 (ICC
Publishing, Paris 1992). For a commentary, see F. De Ly, Recente ontwikkelingen inzake bankgaranties, 1418-
1421 (NJB 1992); H.J. Pabbruwe, Uniforme regels voor bankgaranties van de Internationale Kamer van Koophandel,
921-925 (WPNR 1993); Bertrams, R.I.V.F., Uniforme regels voor bankgaranties van de Internationale Kamer van
Koophandel, 95-100 (TVVS 1993); Bannier, F.A.W., ICC Uniform Rules fsr Demand Guarantees, 23-24 (Feb. 5,
1992); C. Martin & M. Delierneux, Les nouvelles rigles uniformes de la C.C.I. relatives aux garanties sur demande,
Revue de droit commercial beige, 288-328 (1993); M. Vasseur, Les nouvelles rigles de la Chambre de Commerce
Internationale pour ks garanties sur demande, 239-2 96 (RDAIIIBLJ 1992); S. PiedeliUvre, Remarques sur les rgles
uniformes de la CCI relatives aux garanties sur demande, Rev.trim.dr.com. 615-630 (1993).
16. M. Vasseur, supra note 15 at 248, 250.
17. F. Von Westphalen, Die neuen einheidichen Richtlinien fur "Demand Guarantees," 2021 (DB 1992).
18. See R. Goode, Guide to the ICC Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, 86-87, ICC Pub. No. 510, Paris,
ICC Publishing, 1992.
19. F. De Ly, supra note 15, at 1421; K.P. Berger, Internationale Bankgarantien, Deutsche Zeitschift fur
Wirtschaftsrecht, 10 (1993); compare HJ. Pabbruwe, Bankgarantie, 20 (2nd ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1995).
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force if a bank decides to pay before the account party has been able to obtain interim
relief. The URDG aim, however incompletely, is to achieve a more even distribution of
risk between account parties and beneficiaries than was previously the case. From the side
of the account parties, the rules have been applauded.20 Also banks seem to approve of the
URDG.2' However, the success of the URDG will probably be varied. Since the URDG
are not formulated custom or usage, they are contract terms to which parties must agree.
In a buyers' market the beneficiary will frequently refuse to accept the URDG, which would
worsen their position. The URDG seems to be preferable for markets in which the bar-
gaining positions of account party and beneficiary are not clearly skewed. Since the URDG
do not replace the UCG, both rules will remain in force at the same time.
In the aftermath of the Convention's negotiations (1988-1994) and as a result of U.S.
concerns about the application of the Convention to the U.S. financial stand-by letter of
credit market,2 the Maryland based Institute of International Banking Law & Practice,
with the support of the U.S. Council on International Banking (USCIB, now the Inter-
national Financial Services Association) embarked on a project to formulate self-regulatory
rules for the U.S. stand-by letter of credit market. This International Standby Practices
Project (ISP Project) was aimed at providing self-regulatory rules that were more appro-
priate than the UCP to address stand-by letter of credit problems. Because the ICC did
not initiate rules regarding stand-by letters of credit, the project started in the United States
and not at the ICC level. The ISP Project led to International Standby Practices (ISP98)
which were adopted by USCIB.23 ISP98 were subsequently submitted to the ICC for ap-
proval and the ICC Banking Commission on April 6, 1998, endorsed the rules and they
took effect as ofJanuary 1, 1999.24 Also, the ISP project was intended to draft self-regulatory
rules complimentary to the Convention in order to address the above-mentioned U.S.
concerns. A consequence of specific U.S.-initiated self-regulation for stand-by letters of
credit may be that the United States may now proceed with ratification of the Convention.
Contrary to URDG, ISP98 do not attempt to police fraud. Under Rules 4.16 and 4.17 of
ISP98, a demand for payment under a stand-by letter of credit subject to ISP98 should not
indicate a default or other event under the underlying transaction if that is not required
under the terms of the stand-by letter of credit. Furthermore, the issuer under Rule 3.10,
unlike under Article 17 URDG, is not required to notify the account party of receipt of a
demand for payment under the stand-by.
From the foregoing, it appears that regarding guarantees and stand-by letters of credit,
four instruments for self-regulation are available: 5 1) the UCP for stand-by letters of credit;
20. De Galard, supra note 10, at 764.
21. See HJ. Pabbruwe, supra note 15, at 921-925.
22. These concerns were already raised in 1992 by the U.S. delegation to the UNCITRAL workingsessions
and led to the ultimately unsuccessful U.S. proposals to incorporate into the convention specific rules on stand-
by letters of credit (see UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.77 (1992).
23. International Standby Practices (ISP98) ICC Pub. No. 590, 76 (ICC Publishing, Paris Oct. 1998). For
a commentary, see J. Byrne, The Official Commentary on the International Standby Practices 353, J. Barnes, Mont-
gomery Village, Institute of International Banking Law & Practice (ed. 1998).
24. For further discussions seeJ. Byrne, Standby Rulemaking: A Glimpse at the Elements of Standardization
and Harmonization of Banking Practice, in NEw DEVELOPMENTs IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND CON-
SUMER LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMMERCIAL
AND CONSUMER LAW, 13 5-160, (J. Ziegel, ed., Oxford, Hart 1998);J. Dolan, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT,
REVISED EDITION, Chapter 4 at 94-113 (1999); J. Dolan, Analyzing Bank Drafted Standby Letter of Credit Rules,
The International Standby Practices (1SP98), WAYNE L.REv. 1999 (forthcoming).
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2) the ISP98 for stand-by letters of credit; 3) the UCG for conditional guarantees; 26 and 4)
the URDG for reasoned demand guarantees.
Parallel to the ICC's activities regarding bank guarantees and stand-by letters of credit,
UNCITRAL has been working on a convention regarding guarantees and stand-by letters
of credit, which culminated in the Convention of December 11, 1995 and will be discussed
below in greater detail. Also, the relationship between the four previously mentioned forms
of self-regulation and the need for a convention in addition to self-regulation, will be ad-
dressed.
M. Summary of the Convention
A. CLOSING ARTICLES
The UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit is a
relatively short convention consisting of merely seven chapters and twenty-nine articles.
The last chapter contains the traditional closing articles of conventions regarding signature,
ratification and accession, deposition of ratification instruments, implementation, denun-
ciation, reservations, and implementation for states with more than one legal system. From
the perspective of substantive law, these aspects are not very relevant.
However, two particular provisions deserve more attention. First, the Convention will
be entering into force after only five ratifications or accessions. Considering the worldwide
character of UNCITRAL harmonization attempts, the Convention can enter in force with
the ratification by only five countries. However, the success of the Convention will not be
determined by the speed of its entry into force, but rather by the particular countries which
ratify it. The latter will be determined, among others, by the merits of the Convention. A
second closing article that deserves further examination is the one regarding the prohibition
of reservations to the Convention. The unifying model of the Convention is presented on
a take-it- or-leave-it basis, which will strengthen the harmonization if the Convention be-
comes a success. On the other hand, it also puts the entire Convention at risk if a few
articles meet with resistance to which no reservation is possible. Essential to this is the fraud
exception.
B. COTrENTS OF THE CONVENTION
The remaining chapters of the Convention consist of twenty-two articles and relate to
the scope of application of the Convention, its interpretation, the form and content of the
guarantee and stand-by letter of credit, the rights, obligations, and defenses of the parties
involved, the provisional and conservatory measures available to prevent or block payment
under the guarantee or stand-by letter of credit, and the applicable law. These articles will
be dealt with briefly in light of their relevance to the central questions posed in this article:
25. One may deplore that UCP and ISP98 exist at the same time and that the next revision of the UCP did
not incorporate specific rules for stand-by letters of credit. If ISP98 is not successful, this option may still be
available. If ISP98 becomes a success, one might consider excluding stand-by letters of credit from the UCP.
In that scenario, UCP would apply to commercial letters of credit and ISP98 to stand-by letters of credit. In
any event, one may anticipate that some novel provisions in ISP98 may influence the next revision of the UCP.
26. Hereafter, URG will no longer be discussed because these rules are hardly used in practice.
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the desirability of the ratification of the Convention and the importance of the Convention
in practice.
C. CONFLICT RULES
The Convention is innovative in its method of unification. Traditionally, unification of
substantive law and private international law were seen as separate endeavors undertaken
mainly by different harmonizing organizations. However, the Convention has chosen a
combined method; Articles 1 through 20 contain substantive law rules while Articles 21
and 22 contain private international law rules. The latter aim merely to solve the problem
of the applicable law. Initially the aim was also to include rules on international jurisdiction;
however, this goal was later abandoned. Article 21 honors the choice of law clause as bank
and beneficiary may agree which law is applicable to the guarantee or stand-by letter of
credit. In the absence of a choice of law, the guarantee is governed by the law of the place
where the bank has its business. These rules are separate from those governing the unifi-
cation of substantive law, which have their own rules regarding the scope of application of
the Convention (see below). This means that the conflict rules in the Convention apply
even if the substantive rules of the Convention are not applicable. The conflict rules in the
Convention are thus universally applicable for courts in a contracting state; that means that
no link to contracting states is required.
D. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION
The territorial scope of application of the substantive law articles of the Convention
depends on two criteria. In the first place, the guarantee or stand-by letter of credit must
be international. The Convention follows the dualistic method, which means that a differ-
ence is made between national and international guarantees and stand-by letters of credit.
This was done for political reasons. UNCITRAL was afraid that overly ambitious unifi-
cation would meet with too much resistance when it comes to ratification and as a result
would damage the success of a unifying text. Therefore, the unification effort is limited to
international guarantees and stand-by letters of credit. For instance, the United States may
maintain Article 5 UCC upon an eventual ratification of the Convention in relation to
domestic stand-by letters of credit which is particularly relevant for the U.S. capital markets.
In Article 4 of the Convention, the definition of an international guarantee and stand-
by letter of credit is given. Generally, an undertaking is considered international if two of
the parties involved (the account party, the beneficiary, the first and second bank) have
their places of business or residence in two different countries. In international trade, this
frequently will be the case.
Furthermore, independent guarantees and stand-by letters of credit must pass a second
requirement to fall under the scope of the Convention. The Convention is applicable in
two cases: 1) if the bank which issued the guarantee or stand-by letter of credit" has its
place of business in a contracting state (direct applicability); or 2) if private international
law rules determine that the law of a contracting state is applicable (indirect applicability).2"
27. This is also valid for the extension of a counter-guarantee or the confirmation of a stand- by letter of
credit (Article 6 sub (b) Convention).
28. In contrast to, for example, Article 1, 1 (b) of the Convention on the International Sales of Goods
(CISG), no reservation is possible against this provision.
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Once the Convention enters into force, a state's ratification of the Convention results in
the international guarantees and stand-by letters of credit issued by banks in that country
to fall under the rules of the Convention. Thus, the Convention will directly apply as of
January 1, 2000 to international undertakings of banks having their places of business in
Ecuador, El Salvador, Kuwait, Panama, and Tunisia. The Convention will also apply in-
directly if courts in these countries under conflict rules determine that the law of any of
these countries is applicable. Finally, courts in non-contracting states may also apply the
Convention if their conflict rule leads to the application of the law of any of these countries
although they are not under an international obligation to do so.
Contracting parties may exclude the direct or indirect application of the Convention by
opting out. Whether this should be recommended depends partly on the quality of the
substantive articles of the Convention (see infra Section IV and the Conclusion, infra Section
V). Regarding opting out, the question most often raised is whether a reference in the
guarantee to the URDG or a reference in the stand-by letter of credit to the UCP or ISP98
should be interpreted as an implicit exclusion of the entire Convention. This interesting
point essentially is a question of contract construction but also involves the relationship
between existing self-regulation and the Convention. Proponents of self-regulation will
prefer to interpret a reference to URDG, UCP, or ISP98 as completely excluding the
Convention, while proponents of official unification will argue that the URDG, UCP, and
ISP98 are contractual provisions which must yield to the Convention in cases of conflict
between the two. However this conflict should not occur frequently considering that during
the preparation of the Convention, the URDG and UCP were taken into account. Also, in
drafting ISP98, the Convention was taken into account. Finally, the Convention contains
a few articles presenting optional and not mandatory rules. In practice, it should be possible
to interpret the Convention and self-regulation primarily as parallel regulations with a
complementary rather than conflicting purpose.
The absence of a general rule for the possibility of parties to partially exclude the Con-
vention, should be seen in the context of the Convention as partially mandatory law, es-
pecially with regard to the exception of fraud and the provisional and conservatory measures
available to prevent fraud. The Convention contains, therefore, not only optional rules.
This means that parties have four options: 1) they completely exclude the Convention,
including the Convention's rules on fraud, in which case national law rules are applicable
in case of fraud; 2) they completely exclude the Convention and incorporate self-regulatory
rules; 3) they do not completely exclude the Convention, and instead choose indirectly for
the Convention, including mandatory rules in case of fraud; or 4) they do not exclude the
Convention, and fall therefore under the Convention, including the rules in case of fraud,
but are permitted, where the Convention allows, to deviate from optional rules (e.g., by
incorporating UCP, URDG or ISP98). This complex arrangement seeks to achieve a com-
promise between freedom of choice and mandatory unifying regulations for the prevention
of fraud. The Convention does not place parties under mandatory rules, since they are free
to exclude the Convention. Instead by exercising subtle pressure, it aims to create and
harmonize mandatory law.
If the above-mentioned criteria regarding the scope of application of the Convention are
not met, then the applicable conflict rules will determine which national law is to be applied
to guarantees and stand-by letters of credit. This raises the question whether it still would
be possible for parties to elect to fall under the Convention (opting in)? The Convention
does not expressly provide for this. If parties would want this option, they would do best
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to do this indirectly by choosing the law of a contracting state (see Article 1 (b) of the
Convention). The benefit of this type of choice of law is, of course, partially dependent on
the final judgment regarding the quality of the Convention (see infra Section IV)
E. SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION
The substantive scope of application of the Convention is determined in Articles 2 and
3. Influenced by Anglo-American legislative techniques, these articles present in a descrip-
tive and empirical way the definition of independent guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit. These are obligations to pay a specific amount in return for receiving a request for
payment or other documents which indicate the default of the account party. From these
articles emerge the security characteristics of the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit and
their documentary nature. In addition, Article 3 defines their autonomous character: pay-
ment may not be dependent on elements outside of the text of the guarantee/stand-by letter
of credit or have links with rights or obligations of an underlying transaction. This last
reference covers non-autonomous obligations, such as those stemming from ancillary
undertakings (e.g., suretyship) which were especially excluded from the Convention.
F. DEFINITIONS AND CONSTRUCTION
Chapter II of the Convention contains various definitions and principles of interpreta-
tion. It is sufficient to state that the Convention articles also apply--mutatis mutandis-to
counter-guarantees and confirmations of stand-by letters of credit. In addition, the Con-
vention must be interpreted according to its international character and the necessity of
uniform application. Furthermore, the interpretation should take into account the need for
promoting good faith in the international practice of bank guarantees and stand-by letters
of credit.2 9 Additionally, Article 13 (1) from Chapter IV provides that the rights and obli-
gations of parties are determined by the articles in the Convention and the provisions in
the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit, including its general conditions, and usages and
rules to which it refers. This raises the questions as to where UCP, URDG, and ISP98 fit
into Article 13 (1). This article does not expressly provide the hierarchy between contract
terms, convention, and self-regulation. Considering the partially mandatory nature of the
Convention, mandatory rules in the Convention will preempt other conflicting rules.
However, questions concerning hierarchy shall not occur frequently since UCP, URDG,
and ISP98 on the one hand and the Convention on the other hand complement each
other well.30
Also, Article 13 (2) of the Convention states that for the interpretation of guarantee/
stand-by letters of credit and for filling in the gaps in the Convention regard should be
given for generally accepted international rules and usages in this area. Here, construction
and gap-filling are addressed by a mere reference to international rules and usages and no
reference is made to the role of the law applicable to the undertaking. A better means of
29. This article was inspired by Article 7 (1) CISG, which was also prepared by UNCITRAL.
30. See in this regard R. Illescas-Ortiz, International Demand Guarantees: The interaction of the Uncitral
Convention and the URDG Rules of the ICC, in New developments in international commercial and consumer
law, Proceedings of the 8th biennial conference of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer
Law, 161-169, (J. Ziegel, ed., Oxford, Hart 1998).
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filling the gaps in the Convention could have been found, perhaps along the lines of Articles
7 (2) and 9 of CISG. In this regard, it is regrettable that the Convention could not better
settle this question and more precisely the function that private international law has to
play in the gap filling process. It is now unclear whether one must immediately fall back
on applicable law or instead, as in CISG, look first for solutions within the Convention.
This question is not without importance since, especially in the United States, a reference
will frequently be made to Article 5 UCC when these gaps arise. For this reason, it is
already argued in the United States that the Convention will not change very much, and
that, therefore, ratification should take place. For most of the other legal systems without
comprehensive regulations for documentary credit and guarantees, the case is different.
However, the question remains how far unification of guarantee law reaches and when resort
to the applicable law should occur. It is submitted that Article 5 of the Convention should
control this debate and that its obligation to interpret in accordance with the international
character of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its application finds its
counterpart in the obligation for domestic courts not to fall back automatically on provisions
of the law applicable to the undertaking.
G. EXTEND OR PAY AND EXPIRY
Chapter III the Convention deals with the form and contents of the guarantee and stand-
by letter of credit. These articles concern the issuance, amendment, cessation, and expiry
of guarantees and stand-by letters of credit. A comprehensive discussion of these articles
falls, partially considering their limited relevancy, outside of the scope of this article. How-
ever, two elements with regard to the expiry of guarantees and stand-by letters of credit
deserve a short explanation. First, UNCITRAL has rejected its original desire to regulate
the practice of extend or pay requests, under which the beneficiary before the expiry date of
the guarantee requests an extension of the guarantee, or in the absence of an extension,
payment. Usually the bank decides to extend. Article 26 of the URDG contains a few
principles regarding extend or pay requests which do not bring into question the validity
of these agreements and under which the payment obligation of the bank is suspended until
the account party and the beneficiary have agreed with the extension. Absent such an agree-
ment, the bank is obliged to pay. UNCITRAL on the other hand has not been successful
in providing a code for these practices to prevent possible misuse.3' In the absence of a
regulation in the Convention, Article 26 of URDG remains worthwhile, which illustrates
the possible complimentary nature of both rules. Similarly as in the Convention, ISP98
have not addressed nor attempted to solve the extend or pay dilemma (Rule 3.09 of lSP98).
A second element concerns the legal relevance of legislation and usages that determine
that the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit can only expire if the beneficiary returns it to
the bank. This practice involves the risk of blackmail by the beneficiary. Inspired by Articles
18, 22, 23, and 24 of URDG, Article 11 (2) of the Convention determines that the bene-
ficiary cannot reserve his rights by not returning the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit to
the bank if the bank has paid and the expiry date has passed. Similarly, Rule 9.05 of ISP98
provides that the retention of a stand-by does not preserve any rights after the right to
demand payment has ceased. Thus, one notes an identical solution to this problem in
URDG, ISP98, and in the Convention.
31. See also, Stoufflet, supra note 1, at 135-136.
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H. PAYMENT, FRAUD AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES
The most important articles of the Convention are found in Chapters IV and V, which
concern the bank's payment obligation and the exceptions to this obligation. The latter is
primarily essential for gauging the soundness of the Convention. These are the achilles
tendons of the entire regulation, its piece de risistance. If these articles prove to be difficult
for all parties on the market to accept, then the Convention will die a quick and silent death.
If, however, they prove acceptable to certain parties on the market, then the Convention's
entry into force will be a real option. In that case, it will depend on the negotiation skills
of the parties and their respective bargaining positions whether the Convention will be
contracted away or not.
With regard to the payment obligation, Articles 13 through 17 of the Convention de-
termine that the bank must honor a payment demand if it meets the requirements in the
guarantee/stand-by letter of credit.3" The bank is given a reasonable amount of time to
examine the demand (a maximum of seven working days). Article 19 of the Convention
codifies the exception of fraud, primarily the cases in which the bank does not have to pay
(payment is however permitted).33 This article is immediately attached to the right of the
account party to petition the court in the case of fraud, and to invoke his rights which are
set out in Article 20 (for attachment proceedings see Article 19 (3) of the Convention).
Accordingly, Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention provide respectively for the definition
and description of the fraud exception and the measures available to the account party in
such case. The Convention describes the exceptions to the autonomy of the guarantee/
stand-by letter of credit as follows:
1. Any document is not genuine or has been falsified;
2. No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and the supporting documents;
or
3. Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the demand has no conceivable
basis.
The second exception includes the so-called literal defenses-the defenses available
which stem from the text of the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit and which the bank can
use against the beneficiary. With the third exception, the Convention has formulated a
general definition of the fraud exception. Considering that in different countries various
descriptions are given for the circumstances under which it is possible to reject payment
under a guarantee/stand-by letter of credit (fraud, abuse of right, manifestly unreasonable
demand), it was decided to use a general formula for the fraud exception. 4 The disadvantage
of this open formulation is that judges from various contracting states could interpret this
provision in different directions. This risk has been reduced to some degree by the examples
given in Article 19 (2) of the Convention of grounds for denying payment: I) the risk which
was covered by the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit has undoubtedly not materialized;
32. For recent Dutch case law, see Dutch Supreme Court, June 9, 1995, NJ 639, note PvS and the com-
mentary of Bertrams in NTBR 1996, 27-30.
33. See ako Stoufflet, supra note 1, at 138.
34. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the new definition is inspired by American case law, see e.g.,
Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973) discussed in F. De
Ly, supra note 6, at 186-187.
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2) the underlying obligation was declared invalid under the applicable law;" 3) the under-
lying obligation was undoubtedly fulfilled in a way satisfactorily to the beneficiary; 4) the
beneficiary willfully prevented the fulfilment of the underlying obligation; and 5) the
counter-guarantor paid out the counter-guarantee in bad faith.
The regulation of the fraud exception in Article 19 is a success both politically and
technically. Politically, a uniform and mandatory concept of fraud avoids regulatory com-
petition between various legal systems and thus between the banking industries of different
countries concentrating competition on the terms and prices of the banking products and
not on regulatory issues.3 6 Technically, the somewhat open-ended formulation of the fraud
exception has avoided the unholy exercise of reaching a consensus regarding the notion of
fraud of various national legal systems. Furthermore, the description of fraud is strong
enough so that payment as a rule remains while refusal of payment is an exception. The
examples in Article 19 (2) of the Convention make the rule sufficiently clear. Of course, an
open uniform description has the disadvantage that judges in contracting states will inter-
pret this concept differently. This risk is typical of unifying texts that do not provide for an
international court to decide in a binding way how uniform law is to be interpreted. How-
ever, this risk can be controlled if there is sufficient information available in other countries
regarding the interpretation of the unifying text. A few years ago, UNCITRAL developed
a databank that contains court decisions on unifying texts (CLOUT-Case Law on UN-
CITRAL Texts). It also publishes summaries of recent decisions.
In Article 20 of the Convention, the legal remedies are provided which account parties
can employ to prevent payment under the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit. In all prob-
ability, the text of Article 20 suggests that provisional rather than conservatory measures
are intended. In many countries, summary proceedings (such as injunctive relief) could be
interpreted as a provisional measure, although it is doubtful that conservatory attachments
would fall under Article 20.17 Under the Convention, the account party can request pro-
visional measures under which the beneficiary will not receive payment (including the bank
putting the funds into an escrow account) or in which the beneficiary's funds are blocked.
This is only possible under the exceptions listed in Article 19 and if the guarantee/stand-
by letter of credit is used for criminal purposes. Under procedural law, provisional measures
have been given extra guarantees to prevent them from being accepted too often. Above
all, the account party must present the circumstances set out in Article 19 in a way in which
prima facie evidence is insufficient s ("immediately available strong evidence" is required19).
The judge may only allow provisional measures if there is a "high probability" that the
circumstances listed in Article 19 exist and it may be taken into account that the account
party is "likely to suffer serious harm" if no provisional measure is taken. ° With regard to
35. Exceptions to this are cases in which the guarantee/stand-by letter of credit would have covered this
risk.
36. Contra DoLAN, supra note 1, at 16-21, who prefers that fraud be left to be governed by the domestic
law of mature letter of credit and bank guarantee jurisdictions.
37. The text of Article 20, the requirements for provisional measures, and the cases in which provisional
measures can be employed are arguments for keeping "conservatory attachments" and similar conservatory
measures outside of the convention.
38. Regarding problems of evidence, see F. De Ly, Indirecte garanties, betalingsverbod en bewjs, case note Pres-
ident Commercial Court Brussels, May 26, 1988, REVUE DE LA BANQUE, 1990, at 171-172.
39. Stoufflet, supra note 1, at 138, assesses this requirement positively on the grounds that article 20 is not
an open invitation for the judge to interfere.
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provisional measures, the Convention is strict enough with account parties while still being
flexible enough to permit the application of provisional measures in exceptional cases.
MY. Assessment of the Convention
The following presents a list of the benefits of the Convention:
1. The Convention contains a uniform regulation in the area of guarantees and stand-
by letters of credit under which the law of these international personal securities has
become more transparent, the transaction costs for international commerce are re-
duced and the competition among international regulations and national legal systems
has been diminished. Fifteen years ago, these uniform regulations would have been
premature. In the meantime, however, security law has developed enough to warrant
unification.41
2. The Convention contains mandatory law among others important in practice regard-
ing fraud, 42 thereby achieving important unifying results.
3. Limiting unification to international guarantees and stand-by letters of credit could
perhaps be regarded as a disappointment. From a more realistic political viewpoint,
it is still necessary to consider that the United States has extensive rules which were
recently revised, which codify both international and national stand-by letters of
credit, and which in all likelihood it does not want to abandon for an international
unifying instrument which also would extend to domestic transactions. However,
countries which do not face a similar problem may decide to expand the convention
rules to include internal domestic law (in civil law countries, for example, through
incorporation in Civil Codes or in special statutes).
4. The combination of private international law and the unification of substantive law
in one unifying instrument is a fortuitous choice and heightens the transparency at
the international level of relevant rules.
5. The Convention concerns not only guarantees, but also stand-by letters of credit (in
contrast to self-regulation, in which four forms of regulation exist side-by-side) so
that the rules of the Convention-conforming with the UNCITRAL mandate-are
available worldwide. In addition, similar rules are applicable to functionally equivalent
bank products, which prevents competitive distortions between these different prod-
ucts eventually offered in different countries.
6. The Convention complements the existing self-regulation provided for in URDG,
UCG, UCP, and ISP98. Parties on the market can choose between five types of in-
struments or a combination thereof: bank guarantees governed by the URDG; bank
guarantees governed by the UCG; stand-by letters of credit governed by the UCP;
stand-by letters of credit governed by ISP98; and instruments governed by the Con-
vention. The Convention does not provide the account party with the highest amount
40. Also here there is an obvious influence of American law concerning the procedural requirements for
injunctive relief. See De Ly, supra note 6, at 189.
41. See L. Gorton, rupra note 1, at 48-49, and Bertrams, supra note 1, at 590-595, who doubt the timeliness
of the convention in light of existing self-regulation. Official regulation and self-regulation are, however, com-
plementary.
42. See UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/301, 20-21.
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of protection from fraud. In the UCG, the account party is protected by the require-
ment that a document is provided which proves default, while Article 17 of URDG
requires that a demand for payment state the reasons. Under Article 15 (3) of the
Convention none of this is required; the Convention limits itself to the statement that
the beneficiary is considered to have judged whether or not the demand is made in
good faith and whether the exceptions listed in Article 19 (1) apply. The weakness
contained in the article concerning the beneficiary's examination of his own conscience
shall in practice in cases of fraud prove to be meaningless and ineffective in countering
fraud . 3 However the practical difference between URDG and the Convention in this
perspective is not to be exaggerated; also the reasoned demand of payment by the
beneficiary in many cases will not prevent fraud.
7. The majority of Convention articles prove to be acceptable considering they codify
law in many countries and resolve controversial points in a defensible manner (see for
example, Articles 9 and 10 with regard to assignment" or Article 18 with regard to
set- off).
The following can be considered the drawbacks of the Convention:
1. The Convention does not provide a clear method for filling its gaps and in particular
does not define the role of private international law in this endeavor.
2. The style of the Convention text is cumbersome in places and rather dominated by
common law drafting techniques (as opposed to civil law rule making). However, this
is fairly typical of attempts at unification in which political and legal cultural compro-
mises must be made, rather than a true argument against unification.
3. Article 13 of the Convention does not contain rules for the extend or pay problem as
in Article 26 of URDG.
4. The Convention does not contain sufficiently detailed rules for counter-guarantees
or confirmation of stand-by letters of credit.
41
5. The Convention fraud rules are defensible from the perspective of banks and bene-
ficiaries. However, the account party is left in the cold if a demand for payment is
made and the bank makes payment without notifying the account party. The Con-
vention does not place an obligation on the bank to provide information" and to wait
a few days before payment is made so that in cases of fraud the account party is not
in a legal position to take immediate action. The Convention would have achieved a
better balance by including an obligation to provide information and to delay pay-
ment.47 Only then would market participants have been able to choose between strong
43. This solution is deplored by Stoufflet, supra note 1, at 135.
44. See H. J. Pabbruwe, Nogmaas: overdracbt van de recbten uit een abstracte bankgarantie, WPNR 1995, 6194,
at 605-606.
45. See also, Stoufflet, supra note I, at 138.
46. For this discussion in the UNCITRAL Working Group and the divergent opinions and arguments, see
UNCITRAL Doc. A./CN.9/345, 6-7; A/CN.9/361, par 24-29; A/CN.9/374, 18-19, A/CN.9/391, 29. From
this last document it appears that an obligation to provide information was finally abandoned since it would
be counter to the practice for stand-by letters of credit (including, in that case, the applicable UCP); in this
context see the resistance of the U.S. in UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/WP.II/WP.77 (Proposal of the United
States of America) at 15. Wringing guarantees and stand-by letters of credit into one unifying instrumenttook
its toll; a successful unification was considered more important than saving the obligation to provide infor-
mation.
47. See also R.I.V.F. Bertrams, Omtrent de waarschuwingsplicht van de bank bj de bankgarantie, WPNR 1987,
5843, at 515-519; De Ly, supra note 6, at 176-179.
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protection against fraud under URG documentary guarantees, moderate protection
under the Convention and minimal protection under the URDG. In this instance the
Convention is not innovative, and is too closely alligned with the self-regulation of
URDG and UCP, by which it has missed an important chance. In practice, regarding
fraud prevention, a choice will have to be made between URG on the one hand, and
URDG, UCP, ISP98, or the Convention on the other.
6. There is a risk that the success and practical importance of the Convention may be
reduced if ISP98 proved to become banking practice or to be used frequently in the
United States particularly regarding financial stand-by letters of credit. Ratification of
the Convention by the U.S. would force the U.S. banking industry to formulate its
position regarding the relationship between the Convention and existing self-regulation.
If that choice were to opt out of the Convention and to incorporate ISP98, the Con-
vention would lose a lot of practical importance in relation to stand-by letters of credit
issued by U.S. banks. Thus, the U.S. resistance against the Convention's attempts to
harmonize both bank guarantee and stand-by letter of credit law in the end might
succeed. Also, if this situation were to occur, one would see that the Convention's ob-
jective to function as a complement to self-regulation frustrated by ISP98, which in
practice may work as a competitor to the Convention rules. On the other hand, this
would offer market participants, particularly in relation to financial stand-by letters of
credit, the choice between self-regulation of UCP and URDG as complemented by the
Convention on the one hand and ISP98 on the other hand. This choice ultimately is to
be determined by the respective bargaining positions of account parties, beneficiaries,
and banks, but traditions and attitudes may also influence the decision process.
V. Conclusion
In practice the Convention will not bring about tremendous change. The Convention
rules barely attack the existing self-regulation, are mostly codifying, and are hardly inno-
vative. One author has for that reason characterized the Convention as an expresssion of
the lex mercatoria.4
For private practice, a systematic opting out at the expense of the Convention seems thus
unnecessary, particularly since the application of the Convention does not exclude the in-
corporation of self-regulatory rules. As to the desirability of ratification of the Convention
by countries, there often is a feeling of conservatism and shyness towards new rules. How-
ever, taking into account the analysis of this article, it might be better if cold water fear is
overcome as it is obvious that the Convention's advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
Primarily the fraud prevention could have been codified better in the Convention, but this
was seemingly politically impossible. However, the economic advantages and the legal mer-
its of the Convention imply that countries seriously should consider ratification of the
Convention, and their position should not solely be determined by the stance of other
states.
48. See Horn, supra note 1, at 1, 19.
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